Restructuring the Supreme Court for a Balanced Judicial Approach

2 weeks ago 0

The upcoming conclusion of the Supreme Court’s term will likely leave behind significant legal impacts, particularly due to its conservative majority established in 2020. While specific cases like the blow to the Voting Rights Act gain attention, the broader issue lies in the Court’s newfound comfort in decision-making without traditional checks.

Historically, the Supreme Court operated with a sense of caution, aware that straying too far from mainstream interpretations could prompt corrections. Examples include constitutional amendments such as the 11th, 13th, 14th, 16th, and 26th, which reversed Supreme Court decisions. Legislatively, Congress has countered decisions, demonstrated by the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009. The Court has also revised itself, evidenced by the overturning of Bowers v. Hardwick in 2003.

However, current political polarization and legislative standoffs have diminished this fear of correction. The conservative dominance, potentially spanning decades, feels secure against reversals. This environment transforms law from a pursuit of neutrality into a conduit for personal policy preferences without accountability.

Reinstating the Court’s legitimacy requires more than increasing seats; the focus should be on altering the judicial power dynamic to reintroduce corrective possibilities. A two-fold structural change is proposed: first, Congress should use its constitutional prerogative to expand the Court’s size; second, rather than a constant nine-member body, justices should deliberate in randomly assigned three-judge panels with authority over final decisions.

This adjustment shifts the motivation for justices. Knowing their opinions could stand unchallenged for an extended period encourages radical decisions. However, if aware that extreme rulings risk overturn by future panels, justices would gravitate toward balanced, precedent-respecting decisions. A larger, presidentially diverse pool of justices would also reduce the heavy stakes of judicial appointments.

By delegating final decision-making power to panels rather than the full Court, ideological dominance would be minimized. Some critics argue this could lead to legal instability with inconsistent rulings from varied panels. Yet, the existing stability masks an ideological control. A panel system would foster narrow rulings due to increased decision precariousness, urging justices to seek consensus.

Implementing these changes is constitutionally sound. Article III grants Congress the authority to adjust the federal courts’ size and structure. Historically, the Supreme Court’s size varied between six and ten justices, and appellate judges frequently operate in three-judge panels. This is not about court-packing but about revising the system to ensure functionality and adaptability.

Restoring the fear of reversal infuses institutional humility, crucial when public confidence is waning. The goal is not a Court that is definitively correct solely due to its finality, but one that earns its finality through correctness.

Paul M. Collins, Jr. is a professor at the University of Massachusetts Amherst, coauthoring “Supreme Bias: Gender and Race in U.S. Supreme Court Confirmation Hearings.”