The American public recently faced multiple system outages affecting services they rely on daily. In just five days, several major disruptions occurred. Microsoft 365 experienced an outage, impacting email and collaboration tools. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) halted nationwide flight departures due to issues with its telecommunications network. Three days later, Chase banking customers were unable to execute money transfers. None of these incidents appear to be the result of a cyberattack. According to Microsoft, there was no evidence of such an event. Chase declared its issue was unrelated to cybersecurity. The FAA identified a remote radio site as one potential source of the trouble while continuing its investigation. Federal authorities have found no connections between these outages, nor signs of adversarial interference.
This situation is concerning because it highlights a potential weakness within internal processes. Over the past two decades, organizations have invested heavily in cybersecurity measures. They perform penetration tests, monitor hostile activities, and employ specialized teams to protect against external threats. However, internal factors, such as planned technical changes, caused at least two of these recent service disruptions. Consequently, the risk may lie with routine upgrades, not sophisticated cyberattacks.
Having served 23 years in FAA air traffic control, and as a retired air traffic manager, I have extensive experience with the FAA’s safety risk management processes since 2006. Organizations succeed when changes undergo rigorous evaluation before implementation. Conversely, they face difficulties when change responsibilities become unclear. Recent disclosures reveal concerning evidence. The FAA reported that a contractor was working at a remote site where a new router was deployed, marking one potential source of trouble. Root cause analysis remains ongoing. Microsoft’s preliminary post-incident report revealed that a previous network capacity upgrade created issues during a later system change. This incident exposed a latent defect, overwhelming servers under load.
Microsoft’s own assessment attributes service interruptions to planned work, not an attack. Similarly, Chase linked its outage to a software bug, remaining silent about how this bug entered its systems. This leaves two out of three incidents tied to planned internal work. Existing security measures, such as firewalls and intrusion detection systems, focus on external threats, not on questions surrounding maintenance schedules, rollback plans, dependencies, or understanding the implications of change failures. Such questions rest with management rather than technology.
Aviation learned this lesson long ago. A recent FAA safety management order enforces a requirement: no planned change proceeds without a risk acceptance signature from a management official. This decision is recorded in the agency’s risk register.
Federal bank examiners follow guidance within a handbook, calling for formal processes to control and approve changes. Though straightforward on paper, true accountability requires more than procedures alone. The FAA described the Nov. 13 router replacement as routine, a task normally completed without incident. However, labeling changes as “routine” can prove dangerous since less scrutiny accompanies them. Past success might lead to complacency, but a single oversight can result in significant disruption.
At present, it’s unclear if the FAA handled the router replacement as a planned change under its existing orders. The Washington Post reported that a supervising FAA official tested and approved the work before the related flight stoppage. This would suggest formal sign-off, yet uncertainty remains about risk acceptance prior to the work, the decision’s supporting assessments, and testing conducted against the live network.
As Congress promises oversight regarding the flight halt, these crucial questions require answers from the FAA. Similar inquiries should be directed at Microsoft and Chase. They should clarify what changes occurred, who approved them, and what testing took place before altering live systems. These are leadership-related inquiries, not technical ones. Microsoft has issued a preliminary post-incident report to customers. The FAA and Chase should follow by providing clear explanations understandable to customers, passengers, and regulators alike.
Simply injecting more funding or introducing new vendors, platforms, or stronger firewalls cannot resolve these issues by themselves. The next major disruption might not result from an enemy attack but rather from a simple work order lacking clear accountability.
Vincent E. Bianco IIIPrincipal Consultant, Marivin Consulting Services LLC
Retired FAA Air Traffic Manager
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